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Maybe, in a book where Roman poets explain media theory, media theory explains transcendence, squids turn into dandies, where driving a car explains ornamentation and haloes, Minoan painters explain 
photography, monkeys language, lipstick consciousness, automata wonders, and 
where a limping Greek deity shows us the way to an inverted form of technology, 
maybe in such a book the wisest form of introduction is to sketch out its most 
important findings to get at least a hint of a skeletal structure. Though the present 
book is not an essay in architecture history, nor exactly in architecture theory, 
there is something deeply architectural about its main argument, something that is 
not a philosophy of the discipline, but views architecture itself as a philosophy, 
which as a consequence applies to a far broader range of disciplines. In that sense 
architecture approximates language, where thousands of years of interpretation 
and thought have structured its formal elements in such a way that even in its most 
quotidian use a deep structure of thought is anonymously at work, a structure we 
hardly notice because it quietly thinks while we act and speak.
Architecture as a discipline has long lost contact with this deep structure and 
both its theories and daily practice demonstrate an enormous chasm that has 
ripped its protagonists apart for almost two hundred years now, namely an art-
oriented approach of the Beaux-Arts and a technology-oriented approach of the 
Polytechnique, the two main design schools of the nineteenth century. This chasm 
is by no means restricted to the field of architectural design, but pervades all 
disciplines that make up our cultural body of thought, especially in the form of the 
division between technology and the humanities. Indeed, the split is merely a 
symptom of a far more fundamental chasm between appearances and workings, 
where appearances are interpreted as if they are text and can be read as if they are 
information, and where workings are nothing but blind interactions between 
forces and matter. In that regard, art, art history, art theory, and philosophy suffer 
as much under the chasm as engineering and design.
The two realms may speculate about each other, fight each other, or be secretly 
dependent on each other, for many the fact that we live in a double world hardly 
poses an existential problem; for people like me, who are deeply in love with both 
preFace
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appearances and technology, it is unbearable. No problem could be more urgent; 
more than ever we are in need of a “nonhumanities” where the two domains are 
interrelated. Of course, we have seen many attempts to cross over, to invent a 
technology of the image or a phenomenology of technics, but the first never goes 
beyond a technology of seeing, a computational view of consciousness, and the 
second never beyond an instrumentalism where “we” and what phenomenologists 
call “the world” are temporarily bridged by tools that are viewed as extensions of a 
bodily experience, making the world into a Lebenswelt, a life-world surrounding us, 
which is indeed part of the body, not of the world. Despite the attempts to 
theoretically bridge the two realms we remain locked in—as in the syndrome—
either working at the dark, reverse side of images and trying to expand the realm of 
materiality and technics as far as possible, or from the other side, to expand the 
realm of appearances as deeply as possible into matter without ever being able to 
explain how things work.
Although a technologist by nature, I set out in Grace and Gravity to “save the 
appearances,” as Plato phrased our task for the ages to come, primarily by a rigorous 
misunderstanding of both phenomenology and technology. The explanations of 
technology I offer in this book are strongly based on workings, yet none of them 
material workings and interactions; on the contrary, the links to mythology and 
religion are pervasive. Likewise my misunderstanding of phenomenology, a 
philosophy that set out, as Husserl claimed, to “return to the things themselves,” by 
which he meant to the appearances of things themselves, and thus fundamentally 
confusing things and appearances. Which I wholly applaud. Nothing is more 
important than the confusing of things and appearances. Of course, Husserl meant 
things as appearing in human consciousness, “for us,” as they say in his field; I mean 
things appearing by and of themselves, a fundamental misunderstanding of 
phenomenology that turns the main vehicle of perception a full one hundred and 
eighty degrees. This is what I start calling phenotechnology at the end of the second 
chapter: things do not appear phenomenologically for us, they appear phenotechnically 
for themselves. Obviously, this requires some genuine philosophical gymnastics.
To be sure, phenotechnology is a strange term, something seems to be wrong 
with it. While phenomenology is a study, and a logic, and a discipline, of 
appearances, phenotechnology seems to be a double discipline, one of phenomena 
and one of technology. That it is not. First, I am not so arrogant to think I might be 
able to found a new doctrine; second, it is largely not a matter of logos, but a way of 
working, and its thought consists of finding those ways. The term implies that 
when we side the powers of appearance with things, phenomenology by necessity 
turns into a technology. As a working principle, it is always present and operative. 
If that is true, and I think it is, there must indeed be something highly disciplinary 
about phenotechnology, yet in a way that is difficult to follow, and that from an 
historical viewpoint must look ridiculous or downright illegitimate. Like Freud’s 
concept of dreamwork—which we discuss in the final chapter—it establishes 
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connections between the most disparate elements. To give an example, 
phenotechnology allows me, in Chapter Seven, to connect specific traits of Minoan 
art from more than three thousand years ago to the moment of photography by 
comparing the specifics of Minoan imagery to the taking of pictures; on the other 
hand, by applying photography as a technological act we suddenly understand 
Minoan art’s relationship to movement. By establishing a phenotechnical loop the 
argument moves in both directions: the working principle explains the 
correspondence of imagery in one direction and that of technology in the other. 
The book is absolutely crammed with such anachronical correspondences.
While Husserl’s connection between things and appearances remained an 
idealist statement, since things can only appear as such in the human mind, my 
connection between the two is chiefly a realist clause: the power of visibility lies on 
the side of things, they appear independently of us. It follows that the phenotechnical 
concept of appearance by and of itself involves very specific properties, which 
are extensively analyzed and elaborated, internally regarding the understanding 
of its reality as existing by itself, externally in relation to other notions of entities 
and other philosophers such as Bachelard and Heidegger, for instance, who are 
discussed at length in the last section of Chapter Three. More significantly, 
the appearance by and of itself is sometimes denoted with the compound term 
thing-appearance, a term that, despite its ugliness, indicates a highly geometrical—
architectural—aspect that links the verticality of things to the horizontality of 
appearances. After all, the term “thing” is central to all realism—the Latin word res 
means “thing” and realis “belonging to the thing itself ”—and things therefore exist, 
the latter again a word of another elucidating etymology from that language, 
namely ek-sist, meaning “standing forth,” a connection I often refer to, implying a 
direct relationship between stance, thing, and reality. However, such a real thing 
does not yet appear by itself, and still relies on an outer source, namely light in 
combination with human consciousness, to appear. A thing-appearance, on the 
other hand, not only stands forth, it also shines forth and makes a claim on the 
realm of seeing, thinking, and feeling, without being a priori seen, understood, 
or felt by others. Before being properly thought through in its philosophical 
consequences, such a statement needs to be experimentally constructed, and that I 
mean quite literally. My conclusion, in the last section of the second chapter, is that 
a thing-appearance, if it exists, does two things simultaneously: it stands vertically 
and appears horizontally, and therefore needs to take a turn.
This turn we know from its ancient heritage as tropos, in English trope, which 
positions the turn unequivocally in the domain of the figure. Now, instead of 
immediately placing the figure in the traditions of rhetoric and mimesis—which I do 
mainly in the third and fifth chapters—I begin by taking the figure as literally as 
possible. The strength of standing does not by itself simply turn into the sideways 
movement of appearing, it requires a specific form of weakening that allows the parts 
of the figure to mobilize and connect to one another in order to construct a standing 
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entity. Therefore, standing and appearing cannot simply be compounded by 
hyphenating two terms; they require a third aspect, something that is not-standing, a 
weakening that enables stance to bend sideways, a doubling that sounds extremely 
ambiguous and paradoxical, which I term contrapuntal based on the classic notion of 
contrapposto. And here we have arrived at the arguments of the very first chapter. Of 
course, it is no accident that contrapposto is derived from sculpture’s vocabulary—in 
rhetoric it is called chiasmus—since sculpture necessarily addresses the problem of 
stance; after all, that is what statue means. At the point where we quote Leonardo on 
contrapposto we establish the link to grace: the appearance of gracefulness is 
paradoxically not of any strength but of the weakness of stance. Yet, its appearance is 
not a question of a static image, but of many images moving through and over one 
another, a blurred and thickened state of the image that the Greeks already called 
shining or radiance. With the notion of radiance, appearances conceptually change 
from a dependence on exogenous human consciousness to an endogenous, inside-
out luminosity where the mobility of the parts shines out but now as issued by the 
whole. A figure, then, is a radiant thing.
This shining-out is what in Homer’s time was termed charis, which translated 
into Latin became gratia and again into English “grace”—remarks we encounter in 
the first pages. (I am introducing the book by explaining it backwards.) The ancient 
notion of grace is deeply embedded in a far older history though, namely that of 
gift exchange. And with the gift we start to understand far better how thing-
appearances work. Purely emphasizing the thing as a realist entity would quickly 
place our relationship with them in an objectivist framework; similarly, an 
emphasis on appearance could—thanks to phenomenology—only be understood 
in a subjectivist mode, since it is based on subjective experience. Neither applies to 
gift exchange, which is of a cyclical nature. The two positions cancel each other out. 
If radiance were viewed as emanating from the object, the concept would go 
against the subjectivist position. Yet radiance cannot exactly be “seen” either, it has 
to be absorbed and incorporated, not at all reflected upon, which would be the 
objectivist response. Grace is put to work, digested and absorbed, which means not 
a dualist process of object and subject but a threefold mechanism of shining, 
absorption, and transformation, often viewed as a sequence of increase and growth. 
These three stages correspond precisely with the three stages of the gift cycle: 
giving, receiving, and returning, three stages that, unsurprisingly, correspond again 
with the Three Graces, which demonstrates the fundamentally aesthetic character 
of gift exchange.
Beauty and grace are deeply connected, as we find in that first chapter, beauty 
being radiant, that is, shining its mobility outwardly, and grace conversely 
transforming movement into a thing. Thing and appearance relate to one another as 
stillness and movement. When we draw a diagram that says “movement” on one side 
and “stillness” on the other, as I propose in the sixth chapter, with two semicircular 
arrows pointing in opposite directions to show the continuous reversal of one into 
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the other, we should put the word “beauty” with the arrow that points from stillness 
to movement, and “grace” with the other arrow. Both beauty and grace are turns, 
transformations, but in opposite directions that cannot be separated from one 
another: the shining of the one is turned into the movement of the other, and vice 
versa. In short, it works.
Yet, the workings of grace are those of a paradoxical machinery, the functioning 
of which are never assured. The fact that grace works on the instantiation of 
movement into stillness—that is, from horizontal movement to vertical stance—
means that a certain type of leap is required, a disconnection in fact. The ties between 
movement as given and posture as pursued can never be directly established. If it 
were, grace would be the same as training, and could be repeated infinitely. Grace has 
often been associated with training, automatism, and habit—we will discover what 
Heinrich von Kleist, Félix Ravaisson, and Samuel Butler had to say about that—but 
the fact that grace cannot be conditioned means there must be a gap between habit 
and inhabitation. We cannot simply fill the hollow space of habitation, i.e. of 
architecture, with habituated figures of posture and movement. This gap plays a 
pivotal role in the book and returns again and again in different guises.
Grace is enabling but not assured; it depends on automatism yet is not automatic. 
The definition of grace as a movement that we cannot truly locate—since we 
cannot say if we are moving or being moved—links directly to the meaning of 
habit and inhabitation. The word “habit” shares its etymological roots with “able,” 
and inhabitation likewise with “enable,” a distinction that resolutely structures the 
whole book. When we view Chapter One, “The Grace Machine,” as the main 
introduction to the argument, the second, third, and fourth chapters develop the 
notion of inhabitation. These chapters chiefly analyze the structure of space—
which by then is not called space anymore—in relationship to the gap and how the 
gap enables figures. This process can be divided in prefiguration, figuration, and 
transfiguration, three steps that deeply influence the nature of architecture, as we 
will see in Chapter Four. Figurate architecture is not an architecture that itself 
takes on the qualities of the figure, but rather lets figures appear. It sets the stage for 
the exchange and absorption of thing-appearances, what I call its spectral function: 
architecture is what brings us in contact with the spectral. The spectral, a term 
which is constantly being revived in contemporary philosophy, involves in my 
view—contra Derrida’s definition of the spectral as “non-presence”—a more 
complete understanding of radiance: if the figure is about the turn of stance into 
appearance, it is also about the reverse turn from appearance into stance, that is, 
stillness and death. The turn of the figure proves to be a double turn, a loop, closed 
upon itself. From that point in the book onward, the dead take an ever stronger 
hold on the argument.
By the time we get to the fifth chapter, “Grace and Gravity,” we have understood 
so much of grace and figuration that we simply drop the notion of habit in a single 
paragraph to then replace the importance of ability with that of its counterpart, 
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disability. Here the full powers of Hephaestus come to the fore, the Limping God 
married to the first of the Three Graces, Aglaea, a name that literally means 
“shining.” Deeply hidden in our abilities it is disability that leads to grace, weakness 
that works, and pain that structures the architecture of the figure. If the second, 
third, and fourth chapters are about the spectrality of architecture, the fifth, sixth, 
and seventh are about our own spectrality. Yet, that involves as much architecture 
as the other set of three chapters. Instead of seeing us humans living in an 
architectural environment, we quickly begin to see how we ourselves turn into 
architecture, by becoming a structure bearing the unbearable—pain—and a figure 
of carrying based on the rhetoric of metaphor and chiasmus. We begin to see that 
the figure of contrapposto introduced in the first chapter is never a figure of 
virtuosity and relaxation, but of true weakness, pain, and suffering. We are hurt. 
Though grace looks like a form of ease, it is difficult and can only be acquired 
through, sometimes extreme, difficulty. We have entered the domains of religion, 
which from our phenotechnical viewpoint means a technological realm of 
appearances, light and spectrality. The sixth chapter shows even less restraint as it 
begins to ponder how such a technology of light approaches McLuhan’s definitions 
of media, to then pursue a radical, decadent media theory which uses the concept 
of spectrality to link the color spectrum to our own deaths. The switch made at the 
end of the nineteenth century from Aestheticism to Decadence becomes the most 
logical step in the history of aesthetics: the more we study beauty, the more we 
encounter decay. And again, vice versa: decay not as the absence of color, but as its 
engine. Color is the fragility of light. Decay is not the absence of light, but its very 
presence, a breaking and division into color that relates the spectral directly to 
bliss. The technology of media, the presence of death, the shining of light, and the 
nature of consciousness all start to intersect. When we get to the seventh chapter, 
falling becomes the engine of the world.
The concluding chapter, “The Stone Reckoner,” shows how this engine can be 
one of design in architecture, in painting, and in storytelling. Machines of things 
falling apart converge with machines of things coming together in a chapter that 
fuses the technologies of color—what St. Thomas Aquinas called claritas—the 
technologies of decay and those of imagination. Evidently, I have not restrained 
myself: architecture taught me to think things through to the end, and while the 
practice of architecture scarcely allows for that, its philosophy does. On the one 
hand, the book is full of structure, permeated with symmetries on every level. A 
first chapter that serves as an introduction, then three chapters combined mirrored 
by another set of three, and concluded by a chapter that once more mirrors the 
first; a structure that is explained in the final section. Eight chapters with four 
subchapters each, all of them with titles that include the same conjunction 
(including a few notable exceptions), which adds up to thirty-two, a number that 
would have made Jung dance around the table, if my adding of Hephaestus to the 
Three Graces—making their trinity a quaternity—would not have already done so. 
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On the other hand, the machine of phenotechnology, like a cosmic Rubik’s Cube 
running wild, relentlessly keeps on shredding history by making its anachronical 
connections, turning the multileveled symmetries into a kaleidoscopic mosaic of 
stories, images, and philosophies.
About the latter two I would like to make a few remarks. As a former architect 
and as a dilettante philosopher, I allow myself to embark on discussions with 
philosophers and break them off with such impertinence that I have yet to fully 
adjust myself to its brutality. The being-hurt turns into a hurting, a slicing and 
devouring, of which at a certain moment Vilém Flusser’s Vampire Squid becomes 
the principal figure. There are so many long and short encounters with members 
of the philosophical pantheon—of sometimes merely a single paragraph—that 
one can hardly count them, and every one of them strategically blind to their work 
as a whole. It’s like the Sack of Rome: I grab and tear off whatever I find necessary 
to reveal any phenotechnical links, basically refusing to see their ideas and 
observations as part of a larger system. In fact, I have made it my own hermeneutical 
method to read every philosopher to the point where I agree with exactly half of 
what they have written. That goes both ways: by starting to read a philosophy one 
deeply agrees with, and to keep on reading until one agrees with only fifty percent; 
and conversely, a philosopher one strongly disagrees with deserves extended 
reading until agreement reaches the same number. I have found this fifty-percent 
rule extremely liberating and therapeutic: one’s own ideas start to become spectral 
and one’s readings turn into a machine.
My second remark concerns the use of images. It is a major question in a book 
such as this, if one should not have decided to profusely illustrate the text, since so 
many paintings, photos, sculptures, and architectures are being examined. I have 
decided against that. First, it would have resulted in a book with virtually hundreds 
of illustrations, and as images go, a reader would see a lot more in those than what 
I describe and would find him- or herself severely distracted. Secondly, today 
images are right at hand on one’s smartphone, which makes the issue a lot less 
critical than just a few decades ago. Thirdly, and most importantly, the art of 
“writing images” allows a discussion not to be interrupted; one can read through 
the image, so to speak, while staying in direct contact with the conceptual argument.
All that remains for me to say at this point is to thank my small group of readers, 
Andrej Radman in Delft, Andrew Ballantyne in Newcastle, and Stuart Romm here 
in Atlanta. I want to especially thank Heleen Schröder for correcting my English, 
and my friends Frans Sturkenboom—who manages to combine a love for 
Heidegger and Italian Mannerism—and Gijs Wallis de Vries, the Dutch Piranesi 
expert who has been of invaluable help throughout. My deepest gratitude goes out 
to the best First Reader one could hope for, Joke Brouwer, who read and commented 
on every chapter in various stages over the period of three-and-a-half years.
Atlanta, June 2019
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